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BUCKLER: I would like to introduce our first panel. Our
moderator is Professor Lung-chu Chen, who teaches international
law, constitutional law, and international human rights law. He has
recently written a book, entitled An Introduction to Contemporary
International Law. He has also written an award-winning book on
nation building in Taiwan, which was originally published more than
twenty years ago in the United States, but until last year was banned
in Taiwan. I'll turn it over to Professor Chen.
LUNG-CHU CHEN: Thank you very much, Carol. Good morning.
As moderator for this panel on recent developments in refugee
protection, i would like to welcome you all to New York Law
School.
The twentieth century has been called a century of refugees.
Indeed, the problem with refugees is a worldwide phenomenon. At
present there are some twenty million refugees who have fled their
467
468 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI
countries of origin for one reason or another.1 This ever increasing
problem affects every country and every person. The United States,
as the land of opportunity and a nation of immigrants, is not immune
from the mass influx of aliens seeking refuge. People become
refugees for a variety of reasons. Some become refugees due to
national or international armed conflicts, disasters of one kind or
another, or oppressive regimes. Others flee their countries because
of intolerable political, ideological, religious, racial or social
discrimination or other human rights deprivations.
Whatever the reason, the number of refugees in the world is
increasing, and the crisis shows no sign of abating. Arthur Helton
gave us some very vivid figures earlier. On the global level, from
the League of Nations to the United Nations, continuous international
efforts have been made to improve the status and treatment of
refugees. Post-World War II efforts led not only to the establishment
of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,2
but also to the adoption of two important refugee treaties, namely the
1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 United Nations
Protocol, both relating to the status of refugees.3 Together, the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol constitute the basis of
contemporary international refugee law. They set forth, among other
things, a technical definition of refugee and the principle of no forced
return, commonly known as the principle of non-refoulement.4 This
definition and this principle have come to be widely accepted at the
national level.
In the United States, many attempts have been made to deal
with the refugee problem. The ad hoc, haphazard approach of the
' See Stanley Meisler, UN Reports Asylum Crisis for Refugees, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1993, at A4.
2 The United Nations General Assembly established the office of the High
Comissioner for Refugees in January of 1951. See ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNirED
NATIONS AFFAIRS 65 (Clyde Eagleton & Richard N. Swift eds., 1951).
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 268; see Lung-chu Chen, The United States Supreme Court and the Protection
of Refugees, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 469, 470 (1993).
' Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, arts. 1A(2), 33(1),
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152-54; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
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past has been replaced by a continuous, institutionalized approach,
thanks to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.' The Refugee
Act provides a comprehensive framework for the admission of
refugees into the United States through an overseas refugee program,
and asylum procedures for aliens already within the United States.6
The Refugee Act defines a refugee as any person who is outside his
or her country of nationality or origin, who is unable or unwilling to
return to that country due to persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution, suffered on account of the alien's race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group.7 The Refugee Act also includes a provision for the
withholding of deportation if the Attorney General determines that the
alien's life or liberty will be threatened on account of one of the five
enumerated factors mentioned above.' This is our version of
non-refoulement.
One of these refugee definitions-a person who is unable or
unwilling to return to a country due to persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution-is a broad one. This definition is also
ambiguous, controversial, and has been the subject of intense debate
and scrutiny in this country. Lately, the most heated debate appears
to center on the interpretation of the definitions of well-founded fear.
Other debates center on political opinion, membership in a particular
social group, and non-refoulement in the context of the Act's refugee
definition.
There have been many recent developments in United States
law in an attempt to deal with these ambiguous terms, and also to
deal with various questions raised by the Act. What are the main
features of the Refugee Act of 1980? What practical obstacles do
asylum-seekers encounter in seeking protection under the Refugee
Act, and what efforts have been made to surmount these obstacles?
What insights from foreign experience can be brought to bear in
dealing with some of the difficulties we have encountered here in the
United States? Finally, what are the constitutional implications of the
' Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (1988)).
6 See Chen, supra note 3, at 472.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
I d. § 1253(h).
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recent developments in our refugee law, especially in terms of equal
protection?
To address these questions, we are fortunate to have a group
of distinguished speakers with us today. Arnold Leibowitz will start
by outlining the distinctive features of the Refugee Act of 1980. Mr.
Leibowitz is in private practice in Washington, D.C., and is
Washington counsel for the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society. He
was special counsel to the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, and special counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Policy. He drafted the early version of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. He was editor of the
Federal Immigration Law Reporter newsletter. He also edited the
first case book on immigration and refugee policy entitled Cases and
Materials on Immigration and Refugee Policy, published by Matthew
Bender in 1983. It gives me great pleasure to present to you Mr.
Leibowitz.
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ: I looked around last night at the young
students here, and I was made to feel my age. It reminded me of my
first assignment, which I thought I would tell you about because, if
you remember nothing else, this bit of advice may be useful. When
I started out at the Foreign Aid Agency, I was given a file just as a
meeting was about to take place dealing with convertible debentures
in a Latin American country. I was told to sit in as the legal
representative. The general counsel gave me the file, and told me
who was going to be at the meeting, including the vice-president of
Morgan Guaranty, and the political and economic counsel from the
State Department, who dealt with Latin America. My concern was
visible, and I really felt that nothing good would come of this. The
general counsel immediately realized that this was my view. He told
me that there is a simple way to handle such an assignment. First,
you should bring the legal materials; the law and the contract. This
sounds very simplistic, but just bring the law with you. At some
point somebody will ask you about it. You should then just open to
the appropriate section of the law or contract, and read it in as
sententious and pompous a method as possible.
The second thing you should do, if at all possible, is to talk
last, or as close to last as possible. Obviously, the decision-maker is
going to talk last. If you're in a big meeting with enough people, it
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should be crystal clear after a while what the decision-maker is likely
to do. If you speak next to or close to last, you can make
recommendations. Since the decision-maker is going to make the
same recommendations, you'll look like a bloody genius for having
done it first.
By the way, this system works. It's infallible. The only
difficulty I have here is that somehow, although I actually had an
option given to me by Professor Chen as when to speak, foolishly,
I said that I would speak first. In sum, I'm not sure why I'm
violating my own rule here.
I was asked to lay out the Refugee Act of 1980, and to
explain where it stands now. When I joined the Senate Judiciary staff
back in 1981, they were basking in the glow, or the afterglow, of the
passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. The feeling was that, in effect,
the problem had been solved. The Act had taken care of refugees,
and now we were on to illegal immigration and then to legal
immigration. This sounds, as everything sounds from a distance,
foolish. But this was clearly the widely held view, especially in
academia, who felt that the Refugee Act had accomplished something
of major importance. Let me describe what was done. I'll then
describe where these issues are now.
The Refugee Act did five things. First, it established, for the
first time, that the United States would receive refugees on a
continuing basis. 9 As a country, we have received refugees in the
past, but always in an ad hoc manner. There was the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948. " There was special legislation with respect to
the Hungarian freedom fighters." There was special legislation in
1953 with respect to people fleeing the Middle East. 2 If there was
a crisis, Congress would pass special legislation letting people
9 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)). The Act, by requiring the Attorney General
not to return any alien to conditions of persecution, in effect established a new U.S.
policy to continuously accept refugees. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm"
in U.S. Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2411 (1994).
10 Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), amended by Act of June 16, 1950, ch.
262, 64 Stat. 219 (expired 1952).
" Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (1958) (repealed 1965).
12 Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953) (expired
1956).
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effected by the crisis into the country. Congress would then go on
to the next crisis. For the first time, with the 1980 Act, we said that
regardless of where the crisis is, we will accept refugees on a
continuing basis. 3
The second thing we did was to establish the international
refugee definition as our own. ' 4 The view before passage of the Act
was that you were fleeing persecution if you came here from a
communist country or from the Middle East. That's basically what
the law was. Now, under the Act, a person is a refugee if he has a
well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
membership in a social group, or political opinion."5 If you have a
well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one of these five
items, then both our law and international law accord you refugee
status. Because of this adoption of the international definition, we
can now link into a variety of precedents in the international field.
Both in the human rights and the international academic communities,
this was considered to be a major accomplishment.
The third innovation was that we established the right of
asylum in statutory law. 6 We obviously already had a right of
asylum established by sort of a common law interpretation. t7 The
Act, however, established a statutory basis for the right to asylum.
This is how you get asylum under the Act: You come to the United
States in some fashion, plead asylum, and, if you meet the refugee
standard, you are accorded asylum status, a special status in the
Act. 8
The fourth innovation is a corollary of the first. If we are
going to continue to take in refugees, then we have to provide for
them. For the first time, we provided money for refugees on a
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
'I Id. § 1 101(a)(42)(A); see Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the
Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1353 n.139 (1983) (discussing the
international refugee definition).
" 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988); see Chen, supra note 3, at 470.
16 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988); see Sara Ignatius, Recent Development: Restricting the
Rights of Asylum Seekers: The New Legislative and Administrative Proposals, 7 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 225, 226 n.8 (1994).
17 See Beate A. Ort, Comment, International and U.S. Obligations Toward Stowaway
Asylum Seekers, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 360 (1991).
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
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continuing basis.' 9 The feeling was that if people come to this
country, they are entitled to some kind of special assistance, such as
language training, job training, special cash, and medical assistance
to'tide them over.20
Nobody pays much attention these days to the fifth and last
innovation, the institutionalization of the refugee program. We
established the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of
Health and Human Services.2" The Coordinator of Refugees was also
established as an over-arching coordinator at the State Department.22
In addition, we established the Bureau of Refugee Programs, which
is also in the State Department.2 3 The Refugee Act made all of these
institutional changes, at fairly high levels, to establish that we were
seriously in the refugee accepting business.
All of these changes, done with tremendous effort, are now
being challenged in one way or another. Let me take them one at a
time. The first challenge is to the decision made by the United States
to be a continuous receiver of refugees. Stated this way, there isn't
much of an issue. The issue really is how many refugees should we
accept, and from where should they come? The statute says that we
should accept 50,000, or such other number that the President sets in
consultation with Congress.24 The way this works is that the
Executive Branch puts forth a number. 25  The Congress then has
consultations in relevant committees, both in the House and Senate,26
and then the Executive Branch goes and does what it wants. At least,
that is the congressional view of the system.
This procedure initially didn't raise a lot of problems because,
id. § 1522(e).
o See Richard K. Preston, Asylum Adjudications: So State Department Advisory
Opinions Violate Refugees 'Rights and U.S. International Obligations?, 45 MD. L. REV.
91, 100 (1986).
218 U.S.C. § 1521 (1988); see Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of
Unaccompanied Children Into the United States, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 137, 154
(1989).
22 Pub. L. No. 96-212, Title 11I, § 301, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1525 (1988)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-326, § 202, 108 Stat. 409 (1994).
2 See 22 U.S.C. § 2603 (1988).
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (1988).
2' Id. § 1157(a)(2).
26ld. § 1157(e).
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when the Act was passed, we admitted a very high number of
refugees-217,000, more than we ever admitted before.27  The
Democrats assumed that they would continue in power and that,
therefore, congressional participation would be generally a force for
good. The Democrats also hoped they would continue in the White
House, which would also make it a force for good. Everything
would be just fine.
Unfortunately, the Republicans, as you know, captured both
the White House and the Senate in 1980, and life suddenly changed.
There was a very conservative view of the Refugee Act, and a feeling
that one should manage down the numbers. And they did. Initially
they had a certain consensus-217,000, based on very high numbers
of refugees from Southeast Asia.28 The Republicans continued to
manage down the numbers, reaching perilously low figures by
1986.29 The number selected by Congress was 85,000.30 When I say
managed down, I mean that the Executive Branch never reached
whatever number was established. For example, if Congress set a
limit of 100,000, only 95,000 refugees came in. At 85,000, which
was the lowest number ever established, only 67,000 refugees came
in. 1 There were accurate charges that the Executive Branch was
purposely doing this.32 The argument by the Executive Branch was
that the number was not a quota that had to be met, but a ceiling. 3
Eventually, with the Senate back in the hands of Democrats,
there was considerable resistance in the Congress to the numbers set
by the President, and, as a result, the number began to creep back
up. In 1987 and 1988, 85,000 began to be taken more seriously.
Then in 1989, when the Soviet Union opened up, there was an
27 See John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36
U. MiAMI L. REV. 819, 854-55 (1982).
s Presidential Determination No. 80-28, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,365 (1980).
29 See Rone Tempest, U. S. Opposes Forced Return of Viet Refugees; Geneva Talks
Seek Way to Resettle 'Boat People', L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1989, § 1, at 5.
'0 See Presidential Determination No. 87-1, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,637 (1986).
31 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1993 11 (113th ed. 1993).
32 See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton, Second Class Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1985,
at A27 (claiming that the Executive Branch had an incentive to characterize the political
climate in El Salvador as improving in order to keep refugee numbers down).
" See id.
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increase of primarily Soviet Jewish refugees, and Soviet Pentecostals
as well, so the numbers went up to about 120,000.14 The latest
number is 110,000." The numbers have stayed between 110,000 and
120,000 for the last three or four years.36
These numbers make an obvious point. They do not exist as
abstractions. Decision-makers don't simply say, "Well, how many
refugees should we choose to let in this year?" Every number comes
with a refugee attached to it before the refugee even gets here. So
if somebody decides, for whatever reason, that we should accept so
many Southeast Asians, that gives you a number of 10,000, or,
perhaps, 40,000. Then somebody else decides that we should accept
Soviet refugees, that gives you another number. Somebody then
wants Bosnians, you get still another number. You then add up all
these numbers. This is how you get the total number of refugees
admitted in a given year. If one of these numbers falls off the board,
the corresponding refugees disappear. This is an important point in
terms of how you build up the total number of refugees to be
admitted.
Again the important questions are: How many refugees come
in and from where should they come? The determination of answers
to these questions often presents a considerable fight. Arthur Helton
raised the related issue of whether the Cold War's immigration
policies are still with us, or whether there are other reasons why we
seek certain refugees and not others."
Now let me get back to the Act's refugee definition. The
definition sounds good because it envisions a poor guy, who has been
resisting oppressive totalitarianism on behalf of democratic forces in
his home country. Unfortunately, most refugee situations do not
come up this way-it's never that neat and clean. Usually the
claimant is fleeing his country because it's just hellish. Stated this
• Presidential Determination No. 89-15, 54 Fed. Reg. 31,493 (1989).
35 See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1992
81-82 (1993) [hereinafter STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
6 See, e.g., Presidential Determination No. 92-2, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,633 (1991);
Presidential Determination No. 91-3, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,979 (1990); Presidential
Determination No. 90-2, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,135 (1989).
37 See supra pp. 460-61.
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way, he doesn't qualify as a refugee. If he comes here and says,
"Well, look, it was just awful in my country, I couldn't make a
living, and the government was totalitarian," he will not qualify.
Likewise, perhaps the claimant was not a real resistor. He will not
qualify if he was a neutral. Another hard question is whether the
claimant was a neutral in a country that doesn't accept neutrality-is
he then a political resistor? What about a labor union guy from a
country that doesn't like labor unions? What about a claimant who
was in the middle of rival forces shooting at each other? Does he
qualify?
Lawyers worry about these types of technical details. There
are all sorts of very good cases. Arthur Helton, Maryellen Fullerton,
and others have analyzed the social opinion issues.38 As Arthur
noted, politicians talk about the issues in a totally different manner.
According to an Atlantic article about the State Department, people
become refugees, not because of political persecution, but as a result
of environmental change and degradation and overpopulation.39
People have to worry about elephants-if the elephants run wild in
your country, then you can become a refugee. That's what some
people are saying now. Or, likewise, if there is just too much sex in
your country, leading to overpopulation, then you can become a
refugee as a result. Well, if this is true or if this becomes our view,
then we are in sort of a Gilbert and Sullivan world where if everyone
is somebody, then no one is anybody.4"
If we are now talking about extremely large numbers, then
countries that are receiving refugees begin to feel besieged. They
already feel besieged receiving twenty million refugees under the
8 See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on
Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.
J. 505 (1993); Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social
Group as a Basisfor Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 39-52 (1983).
" Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation,
Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,
ATLANTIC, Feb. 1994, at 44.
'o "Now that's as plain as plain as plain can be; [tlo this conclusion we agree; [wihen
everyone is somebodee; Itlhen no one's anybody!" WILLAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR S.
SULLIVAN, THE GONDOLIERS, act il, in THE FIRST NIGHT GILBERT AND SULLIVAN
(Reginald Allen ed., 1958).
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United Nation's definition, which is regarded as being narrow.41 If
you accept the suggestion put forth that there are really millions more
unaccounted refugees,42 then how does the definition play out?
Whether we should feel besieged or not is another question, but we
feel it.
We also feel besieged by asylum-seekers. The World Trade
Center bombing and the growing backlog of asylum cases suggests
easy access to this country, via asylum, by criminal elements from
abroad. In order to prevent this perceived siege of asylum-seekers,
we have decided to first remove the magnet of work authorization.
Under new regulations, asylum-seekers will not get work
authorizations, unless they are determined to be bona fide asylees. 43
This is quite different than under the old regulations where one gets
work authorization immediately upon claiming asylum status.'
Secondly, we will facilitate the processing of asylum claims so that
we can, in theory, remove people who are not really asylees.45 The
technical aspects of the asylum definition have engaged lawyers,
while the tactical aspects of it are being challenged considerably, both
here and in Europe. European countries also feel that they are under
great strain from asylum-seekers.
There is also the money question, which has not been a big
issue until now. If you feel rich, then providing some money for
people who are unfortunate is hardly unworthy. But if you don't feel
so rich, which is now the feeling in the United States apparently, then
the questions are: Who are these refugees, and why should they get
any money at all? Or maybe they should get money, but we should
take in less refugees so that they fit within our pocketbook. Our
view in the past has always been that our decision on how many
refugees to take in should be unrelated to financial considerations.
The decision has been related to either humanitarian or foreign policy
41 See Wy Cubans But Not Haitians?, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 2, 1993, at
B2.
42 See id.
43 59 Fed. Reg. 62,884 (1994) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 208, 236, 242, 274a
& 299); see Bill Miller, INS Cracks Down on Immigration Fraud for Profit; Consultants
Who Falsify Documents, Arrange Phony Marriages are Target for Federal Probes,
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1995, at A8.
"See Miller, supra note 43, at A8.
41 See id.
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considerations46
As an aside, my own view is that if we rely solely on
humanitarian concerns, we will have many refugees admitted to this
country. Fortunately, the new young people in Washington want to
rely on humanitarian concerns. In my view, foreign policy
considerations will give us 200,000 refugees. People say: "Well, if
you talk about foreign policy as a reason for admitting refugees, you
must be some kind of conservative power guy." This is not true. In
reality, if you claim that foreign policy is a reason for admitting
refugees, you sound like a person who is going to make sure that a
lot of refugees keep coming in. If you say that you want refugees to
be admitted out of the kindness of your heart, because you are really
a good, humanitarian fellow, then you are being unrealistic. This is
just a prediction, but I believe that the number of refugees being
admitted is going to come down because we don't have enough
money. If our decisions are based on humanitarian considerations,
there is natural pressure to say, "Well, how many refugees can we
excessively kind, good-hearted people afford?" This is one of the
continuing debates between the State Department, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and the Office of Management and
Budget.47
As I previously mentioned, the last of the Refugee Act's
accomplishments was institutional. In this regard, I'll express my
concern about something that happened under the new Clinton
Administration. I may be the only person who felt that the
Coordinator of Refugee Policy, who is based in the State
Department,48 should stay. I know that Arthur Helton, who played
a leading role in the Clinton transition and who is usually a very wise
hand, felt that the Coordinator's office should be eliminated. The
Coordinator's office was occupied by eight people, 49 all of whom, it
"See Maria Puente, Crazy Quilt Policy/Refugee Law Very Very Complicated, USA
TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at Al.
41 See, e.g., Robert Pear, U.S. Plans Big Rise in Quota for Asian Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1988, at All.
4Pub. L. No. 96-212, Title III, § 301, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1525 (1988)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-326, § 202, 108 Stat. 409 (1994).
4' Telephone interview with Pamela H. Lewis, Congressional Liaison, Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration, United States Department of State in New York,
N.Y. (Jan. 23, 1995).
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is fair to say, had almost no influence at all. The issue, then, is why
keep them? My own view is that they kept the weight of refugee
policy in the State Department. Generally, in the past, the State
Department has been in favor of refugee admissions.
Increasingly, the government, which controls money, has an
important say in how many refugees we take in. Additionally, there
is a reorganization of the State Department taking place under a new
undersecretary.5" The Bureau of Refugee Programs is currently
established within a department that also deals with environmental
and population issues. 5 Refugee advocates are very concerned about
this. We feel that our issues are going to get lost among those of the
environmentalists and the population people. The environmentalists,
in particular, are riding extremely high these days. They may not
think so, but everybody is talking to them, even on matters such as
the Foreign Aid Bill.5 2 Their vision has nothing to do with people or
refugee protection. In the State Department world, their voice may
become too strong.
CHEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Leibowitz, for outlining the
major features of the 1980 Refugee Act for us.
Our next speaker is Dan Kesselbrenner, who is Director of
the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
co-author of Immigration Law and Crimes, and author of several
articles on contesting deportability. For his role as a member of the
legal team in American Baptist Churches v. Thornberg,53 he received
the American Immigration Lawyers Association's Jack Wasserman
Award for excellence in litigation and the National Lawyers Guild's
Carol King Award. He has served as a consultant to the Lutheran
o See Thomas Lippma, Wharton Resigns at State Dept.; Deputy Secretary First Top
Member to Quit Foreign Policy Team, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1993, at Al.
s The Bureau of Refugee Programs was established in 1962, and was placed within
the State Department, which deals with a variety of issues, including those involving
population and the environment. See Executive Order No. 11,077, 28 Fed. Reg. 629
(Jan. 22, 1963), as amended by Executive Order No. 11,922, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,573 (June
16, 1976); Executive Order No. 12,608, 52 Fed. Reg. 34617 (Sept. 9, 1987), reprinted
in 22 U.S.C. § 2603 (1988).
2 See The Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-87, 107 Stat. 931 (1993).
53 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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Immigration Refugee Service and the United States Catholic
Conference. He now serves on the board of directors of the National
Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, the National Immigration
Forum, and Centro Presente.
Mr. Kesselbrenner will elaborate on the practical obstacles
asylum-seekers have encountered in the United States, and the efforts
that have been made to overcome these obstacles.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Thank you, Professor Chen. I would
also like to thank the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights
for sponsoring this symposium, and for inviting me to participate.
If my knowledge of asylum-seekers were limited to what I get
from watching television and reading newspapers, I would say that
there's a really serious problem with asylum-seekers flooding the
United States. Since I have been working with asylum-seekers for
the past fifteen years, I know that the media's characterization is
inaccurate and misleading. First, I will discuss these media
inaccuracies. Second, I will present data that the media are not
mentioning. Third, I will offer a brief analysis of why this
misinformation campaign is happening now. Finally, I will raise
alternatives to problems that asylum-seekers face, which are rarely
included in media accounts of the refugee situation.
I submit that what the INS has done would be an excellent
model for a marketing case study. The INS has blamed the victim,
hidden its own faults, and received favorable publicity. As a result,
talk show hosts, editorial writers, and legislators are crying out for
a solution to this so-called problem.
I will use an imaginary meeting of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service officials as a vehicle to demonstrate the
effectiveness of its marketing strategy. Again, I am not suggesting
that this meeting actually took place, but I am using a hypothetical
meeting as a device to illustrate what the INS has achieved. Such a
meeting might proceed like this: "Gee, things have not been going
too well for us here at the INS. We have just lost two major pieces
of litigation. We have to re-interview 230,000 El Salvadorans and
Guatemalans under the American Baptist Churches case. 5' We have
60,000 asylum applications lost out in space that we never entered in
' See American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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the computer." We lost 4,000 files in our Newark Asylum Office.56
We have five different computer systems, none of which can
communicate with each other, and the Inspector General said that we
are completely incompetent. "57
Searing indictments. Yet in the introductory material to the
proposed asylum regulations that were mentioned earlier, did we see
word one about any of the aforementioned problems? No. Instead,
the INS found a couple of situations that they could get 60 Minutes
or Front Line to cover, and other situations that op-ed pieces would
be written about. This publicity augmented the efforts of groups who
want to restrict people from coming to the United States, who may
have their own agendas.
Now, I doubt this hypothetical meeting took place because I
think that the INS lacks the foresight to engage in strategic planning.
Since the INS "lacks the information to gather, verify, and assess
data," the agency is in no position to know whether abuse drives the
asylum system. 51 Fraud does exist. Plainly, the possibility for abuse
exists any time the INS confers a benefit. I do not think that the fear
of possible abuse by a distinct minority justifies lashing out at the
overwhelming majority of innocent asylum-seekers.
The National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers
Guild has a program to recruit law students to work with community
organizations that represent Haitian asylum applications in Miami and
around the country. The people with whom these law students work
fled Haiti because they want democracy, and, as a result, are targeted
by the country's military leaders. Haitians, who had real hope for
" See Complaint, Merida v. Reno, No. 94-5220 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 2, 1994) (on
file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights).
5 SARAH IGNATIUS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 43 n.33 (Harvard Law School National
Asylum Study Project, 1993) (citing Deposition of Marva McAlister, former Dir.,
Newark Asylum Office, INS, at 27, 108 (May 3, 1993) taken in Najera-Borja v.
Slattery, Civ. No. 89-2320 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1993)).
17 H.R. REP. No. 216, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1993), (statement of Richard J.
Hankinson, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice). In discussing the INS, the
Inspector General said that it "lacks methods to collect information, to sort it, to verify
it, and it lacks the coordinating and planning capabilities to use the information even if
available." Id.
8 id.
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the first time in their lives, who attended community meetings, or
who had a picture of President Aristide hung up in their homes, are
targets for the brutal military regime.
Political concerns interfere with asylum-seekers' right to
protection. Our government does not want lots of poor black people
coming to the United States-the terror this image fosters, drives our
asylum policy. I think that humanitarian concerns and international
law should be the driving forces behind United States asylum
policies. The number of Haitians who should receive asylum, if the
law were applied fairly, threatens our government. To qualify for
asylum, an applicant need not show that her or his circumstances are
unique.59 If the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of one of the five grounds in the statute, then she or he is
eligible for asylum.6' The reality is that too many Haitians have
legitimate claims for asylum.
Another example, to demonstrate the post-Cold War dynamic,
is the work of attorneys and advocates who are trying to secure
asylum protection for people from the Golden Venture and other
boats, who were fleeing from forced sterilization and other oppressive
family practice policies in China. The Deputy Associate Assistant
Attorney General was quoted in the New York Times as saying that
we've got to expedite these Golden Venture cases. 1 The District
Director of the New York District, Mr. Slattery, was on McNeil-
Lehrer saying that none of these people have a claim. 2 Are these the
statements of a government that is making an even-handed, case-by-
case determination of each claim that comes before it? By contrast,
I have never heard a social security judge or the head of the Social
" See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1994) (stating that an "[i]mmigration Judge shall not
require the applicant to provide evidence that he would be singled out individually for
persecution").
o 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988) (stating that statutory grounds are race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, and membership in a social group).
6 See Seth Faison, U.S. Tightens Asylum Rules for Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1993, at A45. "'We've made no secret of the fact that we asked that these cases be
expedited."' Id. (quoting Phyllis Coven, Special Assistant to Associate Attorney
General, Webster L. Hubbel).
6 The MacNeillLehrer News Hour: Persona Non Grata? Spanish Si-English No?,
(PBS television broadcast, July 5, 1993) (transcript on file with the New York Law
School Journal of Human Rights).
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Security Administration say that there is a lot of fraud in Social
Security and SSI applications. It is unfair for a Department of Justice
official to speak out publicly about expediting certain cases and about
the quality of people's asylum claims before those claims are
presented in front of an adjudicatory tribunal. Case law requires an
even-handed adjudication on a case-by-case basis. 63
Another political obstacle to securing protection is that people
who were fleeing communist countries or former communist
countries, as late as 1992 or 1993, were granted asylum at a rate that
was disproportionate to the level of persecution in those countries. 6"
A higher percentage of claimants from Russia were granted asylum
than claimants from Haiti during 1992.65
Now, I'm. not saying that people from the former Soviet
Union or Russia do not have valid claims. Nevertheless, I do think
it is odd that the rate of approval for people fleeing these countries
is greater than the rate of people fleeing from Haiti. Once again, this
appears to be a vestige of Cold War decision-making. In the near
future, these numbers should change as decision-making increasingly
reflects the post-Cold War approach. This is a process of transition
from Cold War to post-Cold War. With the Golden Venture cases,
we no longer see "anti-communism" as being the driving force behind
negative asylum determinations. Open hostility towards immigrants,
sometimes called "immigrant bashing" and "anti-terrorism," are
replacing "anti-communism" as the ideological force influencing
asylum determinations. The United States is becoming a more
racially and ethnically diverse place. Instead of welcoming the
benefits this change brings, many politicians are catering to fears
about these changing demographics to foster anti-immigrant
sentiment. Pandering to these fears makes the atmosphere less
welcoming for immigrants, in general, and asylum applicants, in
particular.
Persons fleeing from political turmoil in the developing world
are not welcome in the United States. Often these refugees are
labelled as "terrorists." Once the INS tags a group with the
63 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); American Baptist Churches
v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
6 See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 152 (1993).
65See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 35, at 85.
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"terrorist" label, the asylum claims for members of the group will be
denied en masse. The way the INS treats Sikhs is an example of this
process. The Board of Immigration Appeals will not treat torture as
persecution when the government justifies the torture as furthering
"anti-terrorism. "' The federal courts take a dim view of this
interpretation.67 The Board of Immigration Appeals' decisions reflect
this subjectivity. For example, someone who is fleeing from military
conscription in Afghanistan has an asylum claim, while someone who
is fleeing from military conscription in Guatemala does not. Why?
According to the Board, this different treatment of similarly situated
claimants is justified because the government of Afghanistan is not
legitimate, but is a puppet of the Soviet Union.6" The government of
Guatemala, on the other hand, receives lots of funds from the United
States, and is within the United States's sphere of influence. The
facts and the cases speak for themselves.
There are two ways to apply for asylum. One way is in front
of the INS, and the other is in front of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review. 69 There was a ninety-five percent coincidence
between the Department of State recommendations, and the ultimate
decision in a political asylum case in front of the INS. These
statistics are for applications that were filed in front of the INS. The
ninety-five percent coincidence, especially in El Salvadoran and
Guatemalan claims, illustrates the disproportionate effect of the
failure to make case-by-case adjudications. These statistics reflect an
impermissible introduction of foreign policy concerns into what
See Matter of R., 1. & N. Dec. 3195 (B1A 1992) (stating that mistreatment, not
persecution on account of religion or political opinion, could occur when authorities are
investigating terrorism).
'7 See, e.g., Kaur v. INS, No. C093-3005, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2838, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1994) (reversing and remanding a Sikh's asylum case in which BIA
relied on Matter of R, i. & N. Dec. 3195 (BIA 1992)); Singh v. llchert, 801 F. Supp.
313, 319 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("Punishment, even of those actually guilty of criminal acts,
amounts to persecution if it is excessive and arbitrary and is inflicted with a political
motive.").
"See Matter of Izatula, I. & N. Dec. 3127 (BIA 1990).
6See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unrestricted Adjudicatory
Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 440 n.16 (1992/93).
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Congress70 and the Supreme Court7" have said should be case-by-case,
individualized adjudications.
I think that was part of why we were successful in American
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh,72  which challenged the
discriminatory treatment of El Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-
seekers.73 I think that the United States government did not want to
be embarrassed by a trial that would put on display the bankruptcy of
its asylum adjudicatory process. The veneer of fairness was so thin
that the slightest touch would break it. I think that the American
Baptist Churches settlement speaks volumes about the extent to which
there was discriminatory treatment. The special treatment the
Department of Justice gave to the Chinese from the Golden Venture
reveals that this political intrusion continues to this day.
Asylum-seekers face other obstacles to receiving protection.
The relative unavailability of legal representation is probably the
greatest single impediment. An applicant has no right to counsel at
government expense in asylum proceedings before the INS, or in
proceedings in front of the immigration court, or the Executive Office
for Immigration Review.74 In fact, the majority of asylum claimants
have been unrepresented.75 Fewer than one in four people had legal
assistance when they were presenting their asylum claim.76 These
numbers do not necessarily reflect rampant fraud. There may have
been misinformation in the applications because the applications are
not easy to understand. There may have been people who did not
understand what they filed. In light of the level of formal education
of the applicants, the complexity of the forms, and to be frank, the
vagueness of the forms, it is certainly easy to understand how people
with less formal education, and for whom English is not their first
70 See 8 U.S.C. § 1258 (1988).
71 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
72 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
7' Id. at 799.
74 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988); see Elizabeth Glazer, The Right to Appointed Counsel
in Asylun Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1157, 1177 (1985).
7s Angie O'Gorman, Yearning to Breathe Free, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 23,
1994, at B17.
' See generally id. (stating that most asylum applicants do not have legal
representation).
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language, would misunderstand the information that is being sought.
The INS's current proposals are dangerous. In addition to
charging a $130 filing fee, the INS is proposing no work
authorization for 180 days, and making interviewing a claimant
discretionary.77 Now, to me, this smacks of assembly line justice.
Asylum officers have a certain quota to fill. They have specific
performance or production goals. Since an asylum determination
may be a life and death matter for the applicant, the INS is treating
human lives as if they were widgets. Just as the thirtieth or the
thirty-first of a month are the most likely days to get a speeding or
parking ticket because enforcers have production quotas to meet, an
asylum officer is unlikely to grant an interview on a day. when he
needs to get his numbers up.
What we have in the proposed regulations is no guidance to
determine when to grant discretionary interviews for asylum-seekers.
The INS does not discuss what factors an asylum officer should
consider in reaching his or her determination. It seems to me that the
failure to specify the criteria to interview allows the INS not to grant
an interview for whatever reason they want. In fact, fulfilling
production quotas is one of the most benign reasons that someone
could choose not to conduct an interview. The proposed system
would allow gender, national origin, or religious discrimination. I
am not suggesting that people are making decisions based on these
discriminatory factors, but the absence of criteria certainly reduces
accountability. It is more likely that an officer would decide not to
interview an applicant from a country with which she or he is not
familiar. "Gee, do I really want to learn about what's happening in
Rwanda?" an officer might think. The officer may never have heard
of Rwanda. I cannot imagine anyone having confidence in a process
where the adjudicator had never heard of one's home country.
Asylum officers have a very difficult job. As part of the
American Baptist Churches settlement, I trained asylum officers. If
the INS bases career advancement and performance on the number of
applications one completes, then one has to choose between
expediting justice and career advancement. People are not so
altruistic as to forego a promotion or a salary increase to ensure that
every asylum seeker has a proper interview.
7 See O'Gorman, supra note 75, at BIT.
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The INS's use of detention poses another significant problem
for asylum-seekers. The United States detains asylum-seekers in both
deportation and exclusion proceedings. An asylum-seeker in
deportation proceedings may be released on bond.7" Since many
asylum-seekers arrive penniless, release on bond is often not a
meaningful option. In exclusion proceedings, parole is available in
limited circumstances .79 Accordingly, the INS detains many asylum-
seekers who do not pose a threat, and who are not flight risks. These
detainees are forced to weigh the likelihood of persecution against the
certainty of deprivation of their liberty. Even applicants with
legitimate fears might find conditions of confinement so onerous that
they will examine whether prolonged detention is too high a price to
pay for the possibility of protection. At the Varick Street center, INS
detainees never get exercise. Joseph Doherty fought his deportation
for eight years without getting outside. A detainee might say to him
or herself, "Am I really going to be persecuted when I get back?"
I submit that an asylum applicant should not be forced to endure such
conditions for the opportunity to present her or his claim for asylum.
Even when the INS develops a good thing such as the Asylum
Pre-Screening Program, which makes it easier for asylum-seekers in
exclusion proceedings to be released pending their hearings, INS
implementation is spotty, at best. In New York, a Chinese asylum-
seeker, who travelled on the Golden Venture, applied for release
under the program. The INS denied his request without even
acknowledging the special program under which he applied.
Fortunately, the applicant had excellent pro bono representation, and
won his release by obtaining habeas corpus relief in federal court.8 0
A different judge in the Southern District of New York denied habeas
relief to another Golden Venture applicant who had identical facts."1
This illustrates the lawlessness connected with this agency, and it
really goes to immigrants' relative lack of political clout. It also goes
back to what I began my comments with-the whole notion of abuse
in the system that's been fostered by a very effective anti-immigrant
7' 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)(B) (1988).
79 See id. § 1252(a)(1)(C).
0 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
s' Chen v. Slattery, No. CIV. 93-8163 (JFK), 1994 WL 4290 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,
1994).
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campaign. Perhaps thirty to forty million people watch 60 Minutes
every week. It's very difficult to get a forum where immigrants
would have equal time. Obviously, that reflects the power of the
dominant media. Unfortunately, this issue is being framed by people
who are only providing one side of the issue. The television reports
do not mention INS mismanagement. Such programs blame the
victim, and fail to mention the INS's role. The people who come to
the United States with torture marks, the people who are suffering
from post-traumatic stress syndrome, the people who didn't
understand the application, these people are not being mentioned.
The people who attended their hearings aren't being mentioned. At
the same time, we have the United States blocking Haitian refugees
before they get to the United States's shores.82 As part of "Operation
Blockade," asylum-seekers can not come to the United States through
Mexico.83 In the 1980s, the United States spent money to interdict
Central American asylum-seekers before they got to the United
States." This is part of the increasing effort to build a wall around
the United States. The attempt to build a wall around a nation in
order to keep asylum-seekers out, as is done in Europe, is being
duplicated here through the Haitian Interdiction Program.
There are examples of people who aren't accepting this
current situation. I think that it's a difficult area, working for a just
and equitable asylum policy. While you don't necessarily get much
support from friends, who often ask why you are doing this or that,
there certainly is a supportive community of people. You can
certainly go to sleep at night, although tired, knowing that your hours
were spent trying to do the right thing. President Aristide's
abrogating of the treaty is another potential example of this. As Ira
Kurzban observed in the New York Times, the continued interdiction
after the abrogation of the treaty would constitute piracy.8" In Sale
I See Don't Just Slam Decency's Door, How to Protect Haitian Refugees,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1994, at A50.
3 See Flow of Immigrants Diverted to Arizona, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 5, 1994,
at A22.
U See Bill Frelick, No Central Americans Need Apply; Immigration: Asylum-Seekers
Don't Get Even Close to Our Shores, Thanks to Mexico's Help, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1991, at B7.
85 See Haiti Army is Said to Kill 23 Aristide Backers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994,
at A7.
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v. Haitian Center's Council,8" the Supreme Court looked at the
existence of an agreement between the United States and Haiti as the
legal basis for the United States interdiction program. 7 Absent that
treaty, the legal basis is no longer there. The United States indicated
that it is going to continue to interdict people. Hopefully, President
Aristide will get restored to power in Haiti. If that doesn't happen,
it looks like we'll see the second round of Haitian Center's Council.
CHEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Kesselbrenner, for bringing to
us a sense of realism about political structure and legal dynamics.
Our next speaker is Maryellen Fullerton, Professor of Law at
Brooklyn Law School. She teaches a wide range of courses from
federal courts and civil procedure to international litigation,
international human rights law, and comparative refugee law. She is
a prolific scholar, and has written about both international and
procedural law. Her current scholarship focuses on refugee law.
Her articles describing and analyzing asylum policy in several
European countries have provided valuable new resources in English
for refugee advocates and scholars. The significance of Professor
Fullerton's research has been noted by many groups and
organizations. Professor Fullerton is also noted as a professor, and
has received many awards for her outstanding teaching.
Professor Fullerton will share with us her insights from
studying refugee law and policy in several European countries.
MARYELLEN FULLERTON: Thank you. Members of the
audience may be questioning the relevance of a European perspective
to a discussion of American refugee and asylum law. I believe it is
relevant. By looking at other countries, and how they deal with
similar problems, there are things we can learn. We can learn
approaches that we might want to try, and approaches that we
definitely do not want to try in our own system. More than this, we
can learn ways to re-examine our assumptions. Perhaps, this will
trigger new ideas.
Political asylum is selling newspapers in the United States and
Germany. Headlines feature small boats off the shores of Haiti, and
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
8Id. at 2553.
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large boats loaded with refugees running aground off Queens.88
Pictures of asylum-seekers, fleeing through waves and sand, link up
with ominous warnings of gangs of smugglers whose human cargo is
desperate to reach the United States. 9 Similar headlines occur in the
daily press in Germany, where warnings that refugees are flooding
the country mix metaphors with assertions that "the boat is full." By
examining the asylum realities behind these headlines in Germany and
the United States, we can get a glimpse of dramatic changes in
asylum policy and politics in the 1990s.
Asylum law and policy is much debated around the world.
Throughout western Europe, the last five years have yielded
increasingly restrictive asylum laws." ° My focus here is on Germany
because I believe that it has the most to teach the United States.
There are several obvious similarities between Germany and
the United States that are important in the field of immigration and
refugee law. First, both countries are industrialized democracies.
Second, both countries have had strong economies, which
have been magnets for workers. On the continent, workers from
within Europe have come to Germany as part of the European
Community, 9 and workers from outside Europe have come to
Germany as guest-workers and in other statuses. In the United
States, the immigration of workers from North America and
elsewhere has been a major feature of our society for many decades,
s See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Smuggled to New York: The Overview-7Die as
Crowded Immigrant Ship Grounds Off Queens; Chinese Aboard are Seized for Illegal
Entry, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1993, at Al; Malcolm Gladwell & Rachel E. Stassen-
Berger, Alien-Smuggling Ship Runs Aground; Hundreds of Chinese Swim onto N.Y
Beach; 7 Die in Frigid Ocean, WASH. POST, June 7, 1993, at Al.
9 See McFadden, supra note 88, at Al.
0 See Dick Kirschten, No Refugee, 26 NAT'L J. 2068, 2068 (1994) (stating that
western European governments are in the process of tightening political asylum laws).
91 The 12 Western European countries that currently comprise the European'
Community have agreed, by treaty, to allow nationals from member states to seek
employment and establish offices in other member states. Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 48, 52, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 36-38.
Consequently, nationals of 11 other western European states have the right to enter and
reside in Germany. Four additional western European countries-Austria, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden-are slated to become members of the European Community, now
known as the European Union, in 1995. Craig R. Whitney, Parliament Vote in Europe
Shows Rightward Trend, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at A6.
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and continues to be so today. 92
Third, in terms of political structure, both Germany and the
United States are federal systems. This entails a certain tension
between states' responsibilities, and the rights and role of the national
government.
Fourth, a federal system also has a great impact on the legal
structure, and frequently results in a fairly elaborate litigation
scheme. Indeed, in both Germany and the United States, one of the
concerns in the current asylum debate is the length of the litigation
process, and the negative consequences this has on the asylum system
itself.
Fifth, Germany and the United States share the same
definition of a refugee. Germany has been a party to the Geneva
Convention on Refugees93 since the 1950s.' Germany is also a party
to the Protocol of 1967, 9' as is the United States. These two
instruments set forth the basic internationally accepted refugee
definition, to which both countries adhere.
Although similarities exist, there are several ways in which
Germany is fundamentally different from the United States with
regard to immigrants and refugees. The most basic difference is that
Germany does not view itself as a country of immigration. This self-
perception is extremely important in terms of the legislative
framework concerning immigration and asylum in Germany. In
' See Tom Matthews & Anne Underwood, America's Changing Face, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 10, 1990, at 46..
" Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
The Federal Republic of Germany formally signed the Convention on November 19,
1951, and ratified it on December 1, 1953. Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention
expressly refers only to refugees resulting from events that occurred prior to January 1,
1951. 189 U.N.T.S. at 152-56; Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, 181 (1987)..
9 According to the enabling legislation, Gesetz vom 1.9 1953 [Law of September
1, 19531 Bundesgesetz [BGBlJ II 559 (F.R.G.), the terms of the 1951 Refugee
Convention came into force on April 22, 1954, pursuant to official notice given on April
25, 1954 (BGB1.l1 619) by the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs. See Fullerton,
supra note 38, at 507 n.36 (1993) (citing REINHARD MARX ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM
ASYLFAHRENGESETZ 15 (2d ed. 1987)).
93 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267. The Protocol was drafted to protect persons who become refugees as a
result of events occurring after January 1, 1951. Id. art. 1.
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contrast, the United States sees itself as a country of immigration.
True, immigrants were not always welcomed. True, our melting pot
mythology is under attack, and revisionist historians have put a new
gloss on many of the ideas we learned in grade school. Nonetheless,
in the United States, there is a basic sense that people will continue
to immigrate here, and that people coming to our society from other
lands will enrich us. That vision is not present in Germany. The
difference in vision is emphasized by the lack of a basic immigration
scheme in Germany. Americans are generally astonished to learn that
Germany has no immigration legislation. German law provides no
routine annual method that allows people from other countries to
apply to become permanent residents.96 This contrasts with an
elaborate immigration law in the United States that authorizes
approximately 800,000 new immigrants per year.9 7
At the other end of the immigration process lies the
citizenship or naturalization process. The German naturalization
process is extremely lengthy and difficult.98 This conveys the
message that Germany is not a political community that views itself
as enhanced and enriched on a regular basis by people from other
countries and other backgrounds. Clearly, this is very different from
the United States, where immigrants generally are eligible for
citizenship after five years. 99
Another important difference is the constitutional dimension
of asylum. In light of the German approach to immigration and
naturalization, the fact that there is a right to asylum in the German
Constitution may seem surprising. The United States Constitution
makes no mention of asylum, but the German post-World War II
Constitution enshrined a self-executing right to asylum. The 1949
' Although there is no immigration law in Germany, European Union law mandates
that nationals of member states be allowed to seek work and reside in Germany. See
Fullerton, supra note 38, at 515.
'7 In 1992, 973,977 immigrants were admitted into the United States. See
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 35, at 17.
" The naturalization applicant must complete a 59 page application, and show 10
years' residence in Germany, proof of adequate housing as well as language skills, and
integration into German culture. See Jacqueline Bhaba, Letter from London-Recent
European Immigration Development, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1581, 1589 (Dec. 6,
1993).
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (1988).
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Constitution defined this right in extremely broad terms. It provided
asylum in Germany to all people who had been persecuted for
political reasons.'"° It set no limits on the kind of persecution. It set
no limits on the countries accused of persecuting. It set no limits on
how long the refugees could stay. It permitted no discretion by the
government regarding which or how many victims of persecution to
accept. It was a simple blanket response to the Holocaust, World
War II, and the uprooting of many groups after the war.
There is also another constitutional provision in Germany that
is relevant to our discussions today. It too is a post-war response to
the massive expulsion of groups of people, and to communities
uprooted as boundaries and governments changed in the aftermath of
World War II. This constitutional provision guarantees ethnic
Germans admission to Germany. '' This provision protects people in
eastern Europe, who have grown up in communities that consider
themselves German, even though their forebears may have left
Germany for the Volga or elsewhere hundreds of years earlier.
Needless to say, there is no similar provision in U.S. immigration
law.
With this background, the asylum debate in Germany becomes
more comprehensible to Americans. Because there is no general
immigration scheme, there is a great deal more pressure on the two
routes by which people can legally enter Germany: The general
constitutional right to asylum and the constitutional protection of
ethnic Germans. Both routes have been criticized as subject to great
abuse. One well-known joke in Germany is that individuals seeking
to enter as ethnic Germans can establish their German heritage via the
100 "Politisch Verfolgie geniessen Asylrecht" [Those persecuted on political grounds
enjoy the right of asylum.]. GG [Constitution] art. 16, para. 2 (Federal Republic of
Germany).
'01 The Constitution states:
Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of
this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who
has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the
frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German
stock or as the spouse or descendant of such person.
GG [Constitution] art. 16, para. 2 (Federal Republic of Germany).
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German Shepherd dogs they formerly owned."2 This evidences the
public perception that abuse exists in the admission process for ethnic
Germans. The asylum system lacks a German Shepherd joke, but
there is also a public perception of great abuse of the asylum process.
The media and the government in Germany have very effectively
conveyed the message that most asylum-seekers are not genuine
asylum applicants, but rather economic migrants. This is a powerful
message in a society that perceives itself to be not an immigration
country.
In addition, the numbers of asylum-seekers have been
daunting. There have been such large increases in the numbers of
asylum seekers that many people in Germany are overwhelmed. In
1987, there was a lull-Germany received roughly 60,000 asylum-
seekers that year.'0 3 In 1988, the number almost doubled, to a little
over 100,000.'" In 1989, the number of asylum-seekers increased
to 121,000; in 1990, to 200,000; in 1991, to 250,000; and in 1992,
to 435,000.105 Talk about backlogs! There was no ability to process
this magnitude of applicants quickly, and this intensified the popular
sense of a process that was out of control.
This system, which was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, is
a centralized one. The Central Federal Refugee Office has a large
number of generally well-trained asylum officers." ° The number of
asylum officers approaches 3,500, which is more than ten times as
many as in the United States. 07 German asylum officers are educated
about specific countries of origin. Information about country
1o2 See AMry SHLAES, GERMANY, THE EMPIRE WITHIN 23-24 (1990).
103 See Jonathan C. Randal, Biller Asylum Fight Ends in Britain; Sri Lankan
Deported Amid Criticism of Thatcher's Refugee Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1989, at
A20 ("In 1987, West Germany received 57,000 applications for asylum .... ).
"o4 See Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and
the German Asylum Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 513 (1993).
loS See id.
'o Fullerton, supra note 38, at 534 n.178. The official title of this agency is Das
Bundesami ftr die Anerkennung Auslandischer Flachtinge [Federal Office for
Recognition of Foreign Refugeesl. Id.
"o7 See Ted Conover, The United States of Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, §
6, at 56 (describing "[a] ballyhooed [United States] asylum corps of 150 specifically
trained [asylum] officers (Germany has 3,000; Sweden, 800) [that] inherited a backlog
of 114,000 cases the day they started work in 1991").
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conditions is provided. There are several bibliographic resource
centers to furnish further research capabilities. In contrast, the
United States training programs for asylum officers are a recent
development, as are the efforts to develop a resource information
center upon which asylum officers can rely.1o8
In addition to a centralized refugee processing system,
Germany has a centralized system of assigning asylum-seekers to
asylum centers located throughout the states in Germany. " Although
sometimes described as detention camps, these facilities are not like
the detention centers we know in the United States. In the German
asylum camps, people are free to come and go within a certain area.
There is some geographical restriction on movement, but asylum-
seekers are not confined to the center itself. Nonetheless, the system
of asylum centers presents real problems. These asylum-seekers by
and large, are not allowed to work. As a consequence, there are
hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers in centers who cannot buy
food, and therefore, must be supported by the state.110 This situation
has led many Germans to conclude that asylum-seekers must be lazy
because they do not work to support themselves. This, in turn, leads
to a perception that hard-working Germans are supporting lazy
foreigners who just sit around and file bogus asylum claims. Again,
the approach in the United States is different. So long as they are
deemed not to have filed a frivolous application for asylum, asylum-
seekers receive authorization to work. "' While there may be a public
perception of some abuse in the asylum system, lazy asylum-seekers
lolling about in camps is not an image that leaps to mind.
When approximately 435,000 people file asylum claims in one
'o See Philip Bennett, Short Comings are Found in Asylum Rules; 1990 Overhaul is
Found Wanting, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1992, at 3.
209 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Republic of France. Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 183, 232-33 (1984).
"0 See Michael Devine, German Asylum Law Reform and the European Community:
Crisis in Europe, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 795, 806 (1993).
... Cf Tim Weiner, U.S. Plans to Delay Work Permits for Immigrants Who Seek
Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1994, at Al.
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year, as they did in Germany in 1992,' and they all need to be
supported by the state during a lengthy asylum process, this creates
an unhealthy situation. This situation is exacerbated by another factor
that is a major difference between the United States and
Germany-the cost of reunification. The burdens of unifying East
and West Germany have been overwhelming the population. 113 There
has been a lot of anger about the rising taxes and the real burdens of
trying to unify two countries. Indeed, this anger and resentment,
combined with the negative stereotypes I described earlier, have
encouraged some of the recent violent attacks by young neo-Nazis on
asylum-seekers. This politically explosive atmosphere in Germany
culminated in a constitutional amendment in 1993. After ten years
of debate, Germany restricted the constitutional right to asylum.
1 4
The recent history of the German asylum debate is instructive.
During most of the past decade the Social Democrat Party (SDP) was
not part of the governing coalition. The SDP, though, had enough
members in Parliament to block a constitutional amendment.115 The
SDP had previously worked to block various proposed constitutional
amendments restricting asylum." 6 The political climate changed
dramatically as the number of asylum-seekers soared in the early
1990s.17
In the fall of 1992, the Social Democrats essentially decided
they would never be elected to office anywhere in Germany again
unless they adopted a more conservative, less pro-refugee approach
on the asylum issue. Suddenly, there were real political negotiations
about the kind of constitutional amendment the SDP would support.
"12 See Louis A. Wiesner & Steve Edminster, Asylum Seekers, Other Foreigners,
and New-Nazi Violence in Germany, in U.S. COMMrrrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 121 (1993).
"I See John Eisenhammer, Social Democrats Mired in Wder German Crisis,
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 14, 1992, at 8.
"14 See Marcus Kabel, Germany Limits Asylum to Stem Foreign Refugee Influx,
Reuter Newswire, July 1, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-News File.
11' See Robin Gedye, Europe. Social Democrats Block German Refugee Curbs,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 16, 1992, at 12.
16 See Do They Have to go on Paying the Pied Piper of East Berlin?, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 23, 1986, at 49.
117 See German Right Attacks Refugee Hostel as Crowd Cheers, Reuter Newswire,
Aug. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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Politics was central to this asylum debate-there were many factors
involved, but the political parties responded to the need to win
elections. An asylum amendment was passed in May of 1993, and
put into effect by July of 1993."'
The new constitutional amendment has now been in effect for
three-quarters of a year. It provides that refugees who have been
persecuted for political reasons still have the right to refuge in
Germany, except in certain disfavored categories.119 The first
disfavored category includes refugees who come to Germany through
certain countries deemed safe.120 The constitutional amendment itself
states that all countries that belong to the European Community are
118 On May 26, 1993, the Bundestag [Lower House] passed the amendment by a vote
of 521-132. Stephen Kinzer, Bonn Parliament Votes Sharp Curb on Asylum Seekers,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at Al. On May 28, 1993, the Bundesrat [Upper House]
passed the amendment. Bonn Bars Asylum-Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, § 1,
at 3. The die had been cast six months earlier, in December of 1992, when the SDP
agreed with the Christian Democratic Party, and its coalition allies on the terms of a
constitutional amendment on asylum. Compromise on Reform of Right of Asylum,
AGENCE EUROPE, Dec. 8, 1992, available in WESTLAW, INT-News File. Between
December and May, there was wrangling about language, but the amendment itself was
not in doubt due to the overwhelming support for it in the major political parties. See
Kohl Backs Down on Parliament Showdown Over Asylum, Reuter Newswire, Jan. 14,
1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-News File; Germany: Bonn Steps Up Pressure for
Quick Asylum Reform, Reuter Newswire, Jan. 12, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-
News File.
119 By and large, the German courts have incorporated the refugee definition of the
Geneva Convention into the constitutional right to asylum. Devine, supra note 110, at
795. This international definition, which encompasses persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, and membership in a social group, as well as political opinion, has
broadened the German constitutional protection of those persecuted for political reasons.
Id.
120 Article 16(a)(2) states:
Paragraph 1 [the right to asylum in Germany] cannot be invoked by
those who travel from a member state of the European Communities
or a third state in which the application of the Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and the [European] Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is ensured.
The states outside the European Communities that satisfy the criteria
of sentence 1 shall be designated by a statute, which shall require the
concurrence of the Bundesrat. In cases within sentence 1,
deportation measures may be enforced despite the pendency of an
appeal.
GG [Constitution] art. 16(a)(2) (Federal Republic of Germany).
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deemed safe.' In addition, Parliament can, by statute, list additional
safe transit countries, so long as the countries are parties to and
enforce the 1951 Geneva Convention of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol,
and the European Convention on Human Rights." An asylum-seeker
traveling to Germany through any of these countries, even if she is
fleeing the worst persecution in the world, no longer has a
constitutional right to asylum in Germany.
The German Parliament has enacted a list of safe transit
countries.' In addition to the eleven other European Community
countries, the safe transit countries include Poland, the Czech
Republic, Austria, Switzerland, and the three Nordic
countries-Norway, Sweden and Finland. 24 Think geographically for
a moment. These countries surround Germany-a cordon sanitaire.
Asylum-seekers who reach the border of Germany can still apply for
asylum, but if they traveled through one of the safe-transit countries,
they will almost certainly be rejected. 2 '
The second disfavored category of asylum-seekers includes
those who come from homelands deemed safe.1 26  These asylum-
seekers face a rebuttable presumption that they have not been
2 GG [Constitution] art. 16(a) (Federal Republic of Germany); see Neuman, supra
note 104, at 518-19; Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmermann, Recent Changes in German
Refugee Law: A Critical Assessment, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 362-65 (1994).
12 GG [Constitution] art. 16(a)(3) (Federal Republic of Germany); see Neuman,
supra note 104, at 518-19; Blay & Zimmermann, supra note 121, at 363.
'3 See Blay & Zimmermann, supra note 121, at 365.
124 Id.
" See id. It should be emphasized that the constitutional amendment does not forbid
asylum to anyone. Rather, it says that those who pass through a designated safe transit
country have no right to demand asylum. Devine, supra note 110, at 6. The
government can, as an act of grace, grant asylum to a person who traveled through a
safe transit country on the way to Germany. Id.
126 Article 16(a)(3) provides that:
States may be designated by a statute, which shall require the
concurrence of the Bundesrat, in which, as a result of the legal rules,
the application of laws and the general political conditions, it appears
to be guaranteed that neither political persecution nor inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment occurs there. An alien from such
a state shall not be regarded as politically persecuted, unless he
presents facts from which it follows that he will be politically
persecuted despite this presumption.
GG [Constitution] art. 16(a)(3) (Federal Republic of Germany).
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persecuted for political reasons. 27 The burden of proof is on the
asylum-seeker. 12' Again, the constitutional amendment gives
Parliament the power to list, by statute, homelands that are deemed
presumptively safe. Parliament's list includes Germany's eastern
neighbors-the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Poland. 129
The list also includes Bulgaria and Romania to the south, and, then
moving to a different continent, Ghana, Gambia and Senegal.' 3 °
Parliament can change the list, and there is talk that it will be
expanded.
A third noteworthy provision of the constitutional amendment
allows Parliament to enact summary proceedings designed to make
judicial review quicker, and to limit the number of appeals.' 3'
Legislative proposals for expedited procedures are certainly familiar
to us in the United States.
To summarize, during the past year political asylum has been
a hot topic in Germany and the United States. Germany responded
to the asylum debate by amending its constitution. The German
asylum law changed from a broad universal approach to a narrow,
special categories-based refugee scheme. Powerful political reasons
and a chorus of newspaper headlines led to this change.132
127 See Devine, supra note 110, at 6.
2 See id.
'2 See Blay & Zimmermann, supra note 121, at 373.
130 See id.
"' Article 16(a)(4) states:
A court shall suspend the execution of deportation measures in cases
under paragraph 3, and in other cases that are manifestly unfounded
or are deemed to be manifestly unfounded, only if there is serious
doubt about the legality of the measure; the scope of review can be
limited and belated submissions can go unconsidered. The details
shall be regulated by a statute.
GG [Constitution] art. 16(a)(4) (Federal Republic of Germany).
132 To an American lawyer, it seems strange that Germany amended the constitution
to respond to the asylum debate. If the asylum process is overwhelmed, why not amend
the process rather than the constitution? The answer to this question lies largely in
politics. Amending the constitution was an important political statement. In addition,
many German asylum law precedents arose in the context of interpreting Article 16 of
the constitution. Blay & Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 362. There was some question
about the extent to which procedures could be changed without infringing on the
constitutional right of asylum under the 1949 Constitution. Neuman, supra note 104,
at 521. Therefore, technical legal reasons, as well as political reasons, played a role in
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What can we in the United States learn from this? I
acknowledge the different political and social culture in Germany and
the unique reunification burden there. Nevertheless, we can learn an
important lesson from Germany. Education and public relations
efforts are crucial. In Germany, the refugee community lost the fight
to educate the public. Refugee advocates, non-governmental
organizations, and academics-not to mention refugees-were
marginalized. They were perceived as having special interests rather
than the interests of the broader public at heart. We in the United
States can learn from that. We should spend much more time and
money in developing educational programs. This applies to
academics, who can discover and analyze the useful and positive
precedents in other countries, and can use these to attempt to move
forward the immigration and asylum law in the United States.
But it is much more than an academic problem. We must
identify various pro-refugee constituencies in the United States.
Because we are a country of immigration, we have a lot of immigrant
communities that are natural constituencies. There are also other
powerful constituencies that we can educate. We must speak publicly
about the benefits immigrants and refugees bring to the country in
general. We must also continue to speak about our humanitarian and
moral obligations to refugees.
In closing, I want to emphasize political strategy. There are
always going to be political decisions; there are always going to be
political motives. We want to stress humanitarian motives. We want
to acknowledge that acting on humanitarian motives can yield
substantial benefits that are not easily measured in economic terms.
But we also want to stress the positive economic and social impact of
refugees and immigrants on our society. We need to be clear about
all these elements.
These are political decisions. We live in a democracy. We
have to mobilize public opinion. The inability to do that was the
basic problem in the asylum debate in Germany in the last few years.
We can learn from that mistake and move forward to do a better job
of motivating the United States to protect refugees.
CHEN: Thank you very much, Professor Fullerton, for sharing with
changing the constitution.
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us your experience and for injecting a note of positive thinking.
Our final speaker is Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of Law at
the University of Colorado School of Law in Boulder. He teaches
immigration, refugees and asylum, civil procedure, and comparative
law. Before entering academia, he was an attorney with Hogan &
Hartson in Washington D.C. Professor Motomura has written and
lectured extensively on a variety of immigration law topics. He is
presently at work on a book concerning the role of constitutional
principles in immigration law. He is also working on the revision of
an immigration law casebook.
Building on the presentations of the previous speakers,
Professor Motomura will lift our present refugee law discussion to
the realm of constitutional law, with special emphasis on the
principle of equality.
HIROSHI MOTOMURA: I guess I took Arnold Leibowitz's advice
and asked to speak last. There is actually another reason why I asked
to speak last, and that is that I wasn't sure on which panel I wanted
to be. When I talked to the symposium organizers, I was interested
in speaking on the refugee panel and also on the diversity panel. So
the way I resolved that conflict was to agree to serve on the refugee
panel, but to speak on a topic regarding diversity.
If you think very broadly about trends in refugee law over the
last ten years, one of the major lines of argument for refugee
advocates-in connection with legislation, regulation, and
litigation-has been to urge the application of uniform neutral
principles, unencumbered by foreign policy biases and other ad hoc
considerations. Broadly conceived, I think that this is a call for
equality. The Refugee Act of 1980 is probably the best example. On
the other hand, you'll find numerous instances where refugee
advocates have called for special treatment. The Lautenberg
Amendment'33 is what I'm thinking of, as well as a country-specific
temporary protected status for people fleeing El Salvador. 34
The question is whether these two lines of argument for
Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-167, Title V, § 599D, 103 Stat. 1195,
1261-63 (1989) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (Supp. IV 1992)).
134 See Stephanie Griffith, Festival Highlights INS Program for Salvadorans, WASH.
POST, June 23, 1991, at C7.
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refugee advocates stand in any kind of tension or contradiction to
each other. It's a very difficult question. It forces you to think about
what "neutral principles" and "uniform principles" really mean in
refugee law, and in immigration law generally. It forces you to think
about what "equality" means in immigration law. And looking
beyond that, it forces you to ask: If courts took seriously
constitutional principles in immigration cases, what kind of statutes
and regulations would pass constitutional muster? These are
questions I'm not sure we've ever thought about, or, historically,
have been in a position to think about.
Let me tell you how I came to this topic. I helped work on
a brief involving a case arising under the Lautenberg Amendment.'"
That is an amendment which provides for something called "category
aliens.""3 What it means essentially is that the normal refugee
definition that applies throughout the world, and also to asylum in
this country, is relaxed to a considerable extent for people who fit
into certain categories.
This particular case involved Jews from the former Soviet
Union. If they had applied for refugee status and refugee processing
in the former Soviet Union, they would have been allowed to take
advantage of this relaxed standard. The normal well-founded fear of
persecution standard is lessened in the following way: The burden
of proof may be met "by asserting [a well-founded fear of
persecution] and asserting a credible basis for concern about the
possibility of such persecution."' 37 What happened in this particular
case was that these individuals were in the United States raising an
asylum claim. Their argument was that if they had been in the Soviet
Union they could use a relaxed standard, so why should it be any
harder for them to get asylum in this country? Their brief stated that
"the bestowal of more procedural rights to individuals outside the
United States than to those within U.S. borders not only violates
long-standing U.S. immigration policy, but is clearly violative of the
13S Respondents' Brief, In the Matter of A., (No. 70,524,846), and A., (No.
70,524,847), U.S. Dept. of Justice (on file with the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights).
136 Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-167, Title V, § 599D, 103 Stat. 1195,
1261-63 (1989) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (Supp. IV 1992)).
17 Id. at § 599D(a).
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Equal Protection clause because similarly situated people are being
treated differently. "138
In other words, people within the former Soviet Union were
treated better than people applying for asylum from within the United
States. Their brief urged either directly striking down this
distinction, or at least construing the statute to achieve that effect.
The brief continued in the language of equal protection as follows:
"[T]o avoid the serious equal protection question, this court should
interpret [the regulation] to afford a Jewish asylum applicant from the
former Soviet Union the same reduced evidentiary standard as his
equivalent counterpart would be afforded under the Lautenberg
Amendment."' 39 The irony of this is that an equal protection
argument is being urged under a statute which itself creates a
different standard for a certain group of people. It's no small irony.
The question is what to do about this, or if this is really a problem
at all.
At this point, let me fill in what I think is the background of
each of these two strands of thought. In 1984, Arthur Helton wrote
that the 1980 Refugee Act, is "a mandate that uniform and neutral
standards be utilized in the asylum adjudication process."14' To put
this in broader context, I think that it's consistent with the fact that
over the last several decades, you have not only a greater call for
equality in asylum policy and law at the statutory level, but also a
growing trend toward constitutionalization of immigration, refugee,
and asylum law. We've seen that in a number of recent cases, such
as Orantes-Hernandez41-a 1980 nationwide class action that was
filed on behalf of El Salvadoran refugees arguing for procedural due
process. 142
In the gradual constitutionalization of immigration law,
refugee advocates have had a lot more success in raising procedural
... Respondents' Brief, supra note 135, at 12.
1 Id. at 19.
140 Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act.: An Unfuilled
Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 243 (1984).
"'1 Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (preliminary
injunction), sub nom. Orantes-Hernandezv. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
(permanent injunction), aff'd sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549
(9th Cir. 1990).
142 Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488,'1506 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
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due process claims than in raising equal protection claims. But even
in a case like Orantes-Hernandez, one of the major reasons that the
procedural due process claim was so powerful was that the El
Salvadorans were not getting the same procedural due process as
other nationality groups. In other words, it was in many ways also
an equal protection argument. Another case worth noting in this
regard is Jean v. Nelson.'43 Jean was not a constitutional level
decision, but it construed immigration statutes and INS regulations to
bar race and national origin discrimination." The constitutional idea
of equality informed this interpretation of the statute. Thus, the call
for equality in the 1980 Refugee Act resonates with larger trends in
immigration law, including constitutional immigration law, that try to
bring in not only procedural due process, but also the notion of
equality.
On the other side of this tension is what we might call the
urging of special treatment for certain groups. This is most evident
in cases that try to stretch the definition of refugees beyond the
traditional definition of "convention refugees," to extend it to people
who some commentators might call "de facto refugees." These are
people who seem deserving of refugee treatment, but who don't
easily fit into the traditional categories.
The Lautenberg Amendment is also a good example of this.
So is temporary protected status on a country-by-country basis. The
statute itself mentions El Salvador."4 ' What you have is a re-
emergence, or perhaps a persistence of, ad hoc treatment of refugee
situations.
There may be nothing wrong with this, but it raises the
question of how to define "equality." So far, I've been looking at
this in the context of the tension inside the refugee advocacy
community. That's somewhat from my personal history because I had
worked on this brief. I count myself in the group of refugee
advocates, but I was taking a step back from what I was doing.
At the same time, the same thing can also be pointed out with
respect to government advocates. It is a great irony that the
"4 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
144 Id. at 856.
" Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 303, 104 Stat. 4978, 5036-38
(1990).
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government or restrictionists, who have resisted the application of
constitutional principles-including equal protection principles in
immigration cases for 100 years-would suggest that application of
the Lautenberg Amendment, in the way that we proposed, should not
be allowed because it would violate equal protection.
Another example of the tension from the restrictionists' or the
government's point of view has to do with something that Maryellen
Fullerton talked about, and that is what is euphemistically called
harmonization of immigration law between different countries of
potential refuge. Those who argue in favor of one country being
allowed to rely on another country's asylum determinations exhibit
the same kind of contradiction. On the one hand, there is a strong
recognition that asylum decisions inevitably have some kind of
political justification on a country-by-country basis. Yet there are
those who urge that one country can rely on another country's asylum
determinations as if they were in some sense objective. It's a tension
that exists on both sides, and it's a huge question. I'm not sure I
have the answer to it, but I have some thoughts about how to
approach that question. The question is: What is equal protection in
immigration law? And in turn, what are uniform and neutral
standards?
Stephen Legomsky, in a recent essay in the Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law,'46 pointed out that you would not argue that
there is unfair discrimination in the asylum statutes against Canadians
just because very few Canadians qualify for refugee status.1 47 It's
obvious that equality in immigration law may not mean equal results,
but, by the same token, the neutral rules can be discriminatory in
fact. The problem is that there is an historical absence of serious
consideration of equal protection in the immigration law context by
virtue of the plenary power doctrine. 148 Courts have relied on this
" Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1993).
141 Id. at 333.
14 See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625,
1626 (1992) ("[Ljittle constitutional immigration law has ever taken root. The primary
reason has been the judicially created plenary power doctrine, under which Congress and
the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority in immigration matters.');
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
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doctrine to avoid these questions over the last 100 years, subject only
to the gradual erosion in cases like Orantes-Hernandez and Jean v.
Nelson, as I mentioned earlier.
But there are some other questions that need looking at.
Would a court ever strike down an immigration statute, or refugee
statute or refugee policy, on the ground that it constitutes national
origin discrimination? I'm not sure. The next question is: When do
you know when national origin discrimination is really racial
discrimination? That's an issue that has come up, but has not been
definitively addressed in the recent Haitian litigation."49 Another
question is: From whose perspective do we define equal protection?
Part of the legacy of the plenary power doctrine is that we have
looked at immigration issues as issues of national self-interest. Aliens
trying to get in had no rights. The ground has shifted towards saying
that maybe immigrants should have rights. But is that the right way
to look at this question? An alternative would be to look at it from
the point of view of people who are here, and who are not involved
in exercising national self-definition. Perhaps it's not about
immigrants' rights at all.
You can take this thought one step further, to this question:
Is there anything unique about equal protection issues in immigration
law by virtue of the fact that it is an exercise in national
self-definition? If we look at issues of equal protection in
immigration law from the point of view of those who are here and
have an interest in having people of like mind, ethnicity or family
join them, then maybe what we're looking at in mainstream equal
protection jurisprudence is fundamental rights jurisprudence. If so,
none of these immigration classifications can be looked at under
traditional rational basis grouping analysis, but inherently require
more.
Those are just some thoughts and a lot of questions. This is
very much a work in progress. I don't know if it's a tension-maybe
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,547 (1990) ("The
plenary powei doctrin[e] . . . declares that Congress and the executive branch have
broad and often exclusive authority over immigration decisions. Accordingly, courts
should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion, entertain constitutional challenges to
decisions about which aliens should be admitted or expelled.").
"4 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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it's just an apparent linguistic problem. In deciding these questions,
we need to think about some issues that are very difficult. I'm not
sure we have any answers, but I think trying to get those answers
will be quite worthwhile.
CHEN: Thank you very much, Professor Motomura, for bringing
our refugee discussion into the realm of constitutional law and raising
many issues for us to ponder.
Before we open the floor for audience participation, Mr.
Leibowitz would like to say a few words about the Lautenberg case
with which he is familiar.
LEIBOWITZ: I want to make a point here. I think Hiroshi
Motomura has opened up a very important issue, which is the
difference between uniform principles and ethnic pressures in a
variety of situations. I just want to clarify the Jewish community's
position on the Lautenberg Amendment because we obviously had a
role in its passage. Our only concern was the protection of people in
what we believed was an oppressive, hostile, and dangerous
environment. That is quite different from concerns about refugees
who are already in the United States. We have never taken the
position that the Lautenberg Amendment applies to refugees already
here. Some people say that it does, but I want to make it clear that
the present environment in the United States concerning the asylum
situation is different. Our concern is protection of refugees against
hostile environments. This is what refugee protection is all about.
It's not an issue of whether you have access to the United States.
That is a different question. Equal protection, in the sense that we
want people to be equally treated like other United States citizens, is
not, at least in terms of refugee law, what we are about, although we
understand that in other areas, other groups are very concerned about
this.
Refugee policy is not an abstract question. As Dan
Kesselbrenner noted, look at what's happening to the Chinese who
are coming here-do we think that is fair? Look at what is happening
to the Haitians who are coming here-do we think that's fair? Should
refugee admission numbers be allocated to them? In considering
these questions, one has to talk about individuals. It's very hard,
and, in my view, impossible to talk about abstract numbers that exist
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out there, without a country and human face connected to the
numbers. Thank you.
CHEN: Thank you very much. Now the floor is open.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am a practicing attorney working in
asylum and refugee law. I am happy that Professor Motomura raises
a question regarding the application of the Lautenberg Amendment to
asylum cases that are considered in the United States. In the opinion
of the government, refugees mentioned in this category, mainly Jews,
should be deported back to Russia or to the Ukraine, where they
should ask for political asylum. I can give you a very simple case.
A mother and one son were granted refugee status in Moscow when
the Lautenberg Amendment was applied to them. There is another
son who came by himself as a visitor. He applied for political
asylum, and was refused because, according to the asylum officer
who handled his case, conditions for the Jews in Russia drastically
improved, and there is no danger for the second son in going back to
Russia. I believe that this violates the constitutional principle of
equal protection.
I want to raise another question. If we look at the rules and
procedures, which were promulgated by the Attorney General,
asylum can be granted even if the applicant claims that he was not
singled out for persecution. It is enough that in his native country
there is a practice and pattern of persecution, and he is included in
the persecuted group. So how can we logically explain why one
immigration officer sitting in the embassy in Moscow recognizes that
there is a pattern of persecution of Jews in Russia, and another
officer of the same immigration service in the United States, claims
that there is no pattern of persecution of the same group?
LEIBOWITZ: The Lautenberg Amendment applies both to Jews and
Pentecostals, who practice their religions in the Soviet Union.15 0 In
"s See John-Thor Dahlburg, Soviet Jews, Caught in the Turmoil of Glasnost and
Resurgent Anti-Semitism, Face the Decision of a Lifetime, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991,
at 20.
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addition, the Vietnamese are included under the Amendment."I
Basically, the issue in terms of the Lautenberg Amendment was how
to weigh the historical experience of Jews in the Soviet Union. If
you do not weigh history very heavily, and you claim that nothing
has happened to Jews in the Soviet Union lately, then the decision
that a Jew may not be persecuted, or does not have a well-founded
fear of persecution, may make some sense. But if you consider
history and the nearly 200 years of experience in the Soviet Union,
which can give very modest offical statements all sorts of overtones,
you may conclude that there is a pattern of discrimination against
Jews. Given the historical experience, which links into a whole
series of past events, you get a different view of what a well-founded
fear is.
We had a different view of how to weigh historical
experience. Therefore, we went to Congress. They listened to us,
and passed a bill that would weigh the historical experience, so that
if there is a pattern of discrimination against ethnic minorities, they
would have a right to be treated as refugees. Asylees are not
covered. 52 I want to make it clear that when a person is in the
United States, and he is rejected for asylum status, he does not have
to go back to the Soviet Union or the Ukraine.'53 Everybody knows
this, and we should know it too. The Jewish refugee has the choice
of going to Israel. 54 He is out of the oppressive environment about
which we were concerned, and which the Lautenberg Amendment
addressed. Now, it may be that the refugee has a good case for
asylum, but maybe he doesn't. The operative force behind the
Lautenberg Amendment was protection and concern about the
oppression of people who are in a hostile environment where they can
be arrested and killed with very little notice. This is not true in the
United States. I don't worry a heck of a lot about whether the guy
in the United States gets asylum or not. It might be interesting, it
' See Tahl Tyson, Comment, The Refugee Act of 1980. Suggested Reforms in
Overseas Refugee Program to Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns from Competing
Interests, 65 WASH. L. REV. 921, 935 n.102 (1990).
"52 See Geraldine Baum, U.S. Eyes Limits on Immigration of Soviet Jews, NEWSDAY,
July 14, 1989, at 6.
13 See id.
154 See id.
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might be desirable, it might even meet equal protection standards.
But I do worry about the guy in Russia. I'm concerned about his
access to the system. I want to give him as much access to the
system as possible. That's not an unrealistic approach to the
problem. We are dealing with a very difficult and fragile political
situation in the Soviet Union.
MOTOMURA: I just want to add that in the case that I described,
the judge agreed with our argument and, essentially, he used the
Lautenberg Amendment to construe a regulation. It resulted in a
grant of asylum.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Motomura, what is your outlook
concerning the Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence, and how
do you look at some of the future constitutional issues? How are
these issues going to be addressed in terms of equal protection? Do
you see any way in which a door can be opened to allow greater
equal protection and more procedural due process in this area? Do
you see hope for the future? Do you see change? Do you see
exciting directions?
MOTOMURA: Well, I'm not sure I'd have any kind of an answer
that I would have great confidence in. One thing I see is that much
of the infusion of constitutional principles into immigration law is
coming in ways that are not very constitutional. I think that the
procedural claims have been given a lot more weight. It would take
a better court-watcher than I to make any more specific predictions
about what will happen. One thing I see is that those who believe
that constitutional principles of immigration law are important should
come up with an alternative model. The questions that I raised today
are an attempt to try to form an alternative model, one that says that
allowing courts to scrutinize immigration decisions for constitutional
defects has nothing necessarily to do with one's view on immigration
policy. So I think that this is the most important thing. I think that
if this type of jurisprudence can develop in the decisions, then I
would be quite optimistic. If not, then I would not be.
KESSELBRENNER: I would like to add that some of this
jurisprudence is related to changes in society. I think that what may
[Vol. XI
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help to erode the plenary power doctrine is the notion of borders
changing over time, along with new changes in international markets
and trade. In terms of Europe's formal relaxation of borders, there
have been some snags in the ability to travel freely, and to have one
passport for the entire European community. The plenary power
doctine is really the inherent power of the sovereign to exclude. To
the extent that the sovereign lets this power atrophy, there will be
some exceptions from the power to exclude-for example, entry visas
will not be checked in open border regions. I think that these kinds
of changes in society, in addition to the political pressures from
phenomena like the civil rights movement, will lead to changes in the
Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence. I think that if you look
at most of the Court's major decisions, many of them are surrounded
by social action and pressure in the particular area addressed by the
Court. The Court reflects social activity rather than leading it or
deciding its future course. For example, to the extent there is a
change in the structure of world markets and the flow of goods,
international arrangements, such as NAFTA, which should include
the movement of people in addition to the movement of goods, could
lead to the erosion of the inherent rights of sovereignty.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think that I agree with everything that you
just said, except that a pessimistic side of your notion is that one of
the consequences of the removal of borders within limited spheres is
the enhancement of the supernational conception of sovereignty,
which is what seems to be happening in Europe. For example, while
it is much easier for Belgian nationals to move into Germany, it is
becoming much harder for those who are outside of western Europe
to come into this region. On a somewhat related point, I would like
to bring Maryellen Fullerton back into the discussion of equal
protection. I would like to hear Ms. Fullerton's opinion about one
of the possible readings of the German situation. As law professors
and lawyers, it might be instructive for us to call into question some
of our natural tendencies that cause us to consider two things as
necessarily good. One thing that we tend to think of as good is
judicial review of immigration cases. The other is
constitutionalization, or constitutional judicial review.
Perhaps one of the very ironic lessons from the German
example is that the constitutional court, to a large degree, got way
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out ahead of the German people in terms of constitutionalization. In
fact, the constitutional discourse in Germany might provide something
of a model for the sort of changes that you are trying to bring about
here in the United States. But it was judicial review that was the
problem in the development of German refugee law. I certainly
agree that litigating refugee cases on equal protection grounds is a
good thing. However, I wonder if there is a danger in deflecting our
attention from the ground level political work that really has to be
done. By shifting the refugee issue to the courts, we might be setting
ourselves up for problems down the road.
FULLERTON: I essentially agree with you. I think that the German
experience is instructive because the courts were way out in front.
During the last few comments by the panelists, I kept thinking that
we should not be focusing on the courts. We need to educate the
public. We need to go to Congress. I spoke about the Germans'
failure to do this.. Although their structure is very different from
ours, the German experience teaches us to take a two-tiered
approach. We should have a litigation strategy devised from several
different models. But that should not be all that we have. If we rely
only on judicial protections, and not on congressional and public will,
we won't have a politically legitimate response to the problems we
are grappling with.
MOTOMURA: Yes, what I advocate is not to call upon the court as
a savior in this regard. Rather, we should try to open up what I
think is the normal process of dialogue with the courts. The other
point is one that might usefully compare what is constitutional in
Germany to what is constitutional here. This would be something to
look at very carefully when talking about the United States and
Germany in comparative terms.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to call attention to a premise
relied upon by many of the speakers today, which I think is
questionable. This premise is that in enacting the Refugee Act of
1980, Congress intended to establish neutral principles. I think that
this is not the case. There is really no evidence for this premise, as
a matter of fact, there is much evidence to the contrary. For
example, asylum is made discretionary under the Act. Once statutory
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eligibility for asylum is established, it is still open to the government
to exercise its discretion in granting or denying asylum. On the
refugee side, the statute obviously contemplates geographic
discrimination, and the selection of a relatively small number from
the millions of people who might possibly qualify as refugees.
Now, this does not include the constitutional question of
whether a statute that envisions national origin discrimination would
pass constitutional muster. But it does put a very different spin on
the analysis of the role of neutral principles in asylum and refugee
law, especially in light of the plenary power doctrine. So while many
of us wish for a regime in which neutral principles apply, clearly the
establishment of neutral principles was not what Congress intended,
and it's not surprising that the courts have rejected this premise.
KESSELBRENNER: I'm not convinced that it's a false premise for
the following reasons. Anker and Posner have looked at the history
of immigration law more thoroughly than I. They have looked at the
legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980, and concluded that the
establishment of neutral principles was the intent of Congress."' The
language of the Refugee Act eliminated general references to the
Middle East, and to people fleeing from communist-dominated
countries. The Supreme Court-again, not that they're necessarily
correct interpreters-said that this language shows Congress's intent
to establish neutral principles.' 56 The government itself-particularly
the Bush Administration-as recently as the settlement agreement in
American Baptist Churches, said that neutral principles shall apply to
the determination of eligibility for asylum, and that the remaining
retention of discretionary power with the Attorney General seemed to
be more of a question of allowing diversity. But once the Attorney
General establishes asylum status, there is no discretion whatsoever.
I think that the retention of discretionary power was a way to pick
and choose among the categories of people who demonstrate
eligibility. I don't think that national origin discrimination was one
of the things that was considered to be permissible, especially given
'"Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 9 (1981).
5 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.- 421, 449 (1987); INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 422-23 (1984).
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that, at the same time, Congress deleted the statute's prior language
about the Middle East and people fleeing from communist-dominated
countries.
LEIBOWITZ: I'm not sure that I agree with Dan. There was a lot
of discussion about the Act's intent, and I think that if you look at the
Anker and Posner article, there are really two schools of thought
operating here. The key language that wound up in the statute is
"special humanitarian concern." Most people clearly read this
language as saying that we can discriminate. Why you would want
to discriminate, I can't say. It is true that early works which
discussed humanitarian concerns intended to create equal protection,
and were arguably neutral. But the words "special humanitarian
concern" were put in to the statute by people who had certain
geographic interests. How you implement these interests is another
question. However, I want to make another point about equal
protection. We have focused on probably the most difficult areas to
apply equal protection-the refugee-alien and refugee-asylum areas,
where we're dealing with people who are frequently abroad, or with
people who have foreign policy and national security concerns. The
other issue which is still uncertain is the degree to which equal
protection principles apply in an alien-citizen context. There are
many questions about how you really implement equal protection in
this area.
The most recent proposal dealing with equal protection in this
context is the Clinton Administration's plan to impose a fee on
asylum-seekers, in connection with welfare reform.1 57 We take a
legal inference and say that we have a welfare program that we've
got to fund. We've got to find twenty billion dollars to pay for it.
The way we've found this money is by denying access to various
federal programs. This is how the Clinton Administration is coming
up with the money. The Republicans also have written a bill that
basically says the same thing in a 'variety of ways.158 We are dealing
with an area where, concededly, the Fourteenth Amendment applies,
and the question is how do you apply it in these contexts? Should
1S7 See Making Refugees Pay, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1994, at A26.
's' See Work First Welfare Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 315, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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you apply it at all? There are normative aspects to this dilemma, and
it seems to me that there are real questions here, dealing with both
policy and constitutionality.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I share the concerns expressed by many of
you about the increased narrowing of asylum law, both in practice
and in substance. I find this very troublesome. The media blitz is
certainly feeding and enhancing this legal phenomenon. I want to
bring out one area where there seems to be some hope in opening up
the discussion about asylum law. This is the area of gender-based
persecution.
In the United States, there has been a lot of movement to gain
recognition of the acts of persecution that are specifically targeted at
women. The courts are slowly starting to recognize that there may
be legitimate claims in this area. The INS is beginning to listen to
women's dialogue, and are beginning to engage in it. They are
considering a number of approaches to enhancing their view of claims
of persecution against women. On the policy level, many INS
officers and immigration court officials are now starting to get
training in this area. I see this as a way for women to get their feet
in the door. I also see this as a way to engage in a broader dialogue
about how we make our asylum and refugee laws reflect the changing
international notions of human rights violations.
FULLERTON: I want to point out another somewhat optimistic
trend along this line, which is that we are now seeing positive
decisions in terms of asylum being granted based on gender and
sexual orientation-based persecution.159 I think that comparative
work has really been helpful in this area. I think in particular that
the Canadian Refugee Board's efforts to establish standards and
guidelines for decision-makers concerning persecution based on
gender and sexual orientation has already had an influence on the
159 See, e.g., Ignatius, supra note 16, at 235 n.80 (citing Matter of T., (No. A72-
093-558) (EOIR July 26, 1993)), an unpublished decision granting asylum to a Brazilian
who feared persecution because of his homosexuality); see also Ellen Vagelos,
Comment, The Social Group that Dare Not Speak Its Name: Should Homosexuals
Constitue a Particular Social Group for Purposes of Obtaining Refugee Status? Comment
on Re: Inaudi, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 229, 230-31 (1993) (describing INS decisions
recognizing gender persecution as a basis for granting asylum).
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United States. Hopefully, we will continue to develop our own
positive trends. Also, I hope that we will look elsewhere to see what
we can learn from trends in other countries.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a little distressed to hear our Equal
Protection clause extended to other parts of the world. I'm not sure
this is really what we want to do. What I think may be at stake here,
in terms of the Lautenberg Amendment and the motivation for it, is
a very different right that is already recognized under international
law-the right of people to leave a country to seek asylum elsewhere.
What I would like to ask our distinguished panelists is if they can
think of strategies that this government can follow, other than
watering down our own refugee law provisions, which would enhance
the ability of people to exercise this right.
LEIBOWITZ: Let me say that our goal in the Lautenberg
Amendment was much less ambitious. We stayed within the Refugee
Act, and just gave it an evidentiary chain, nothing more. However,
your point is very well taken. The general issue of the ability to lead
and the recognition of international law is very important. It involves
a political and diplomatic relationship. At the international level, it
also involves the question of whether people have the ability to leave.
And, if they do, where should they go? The world is tightening up.
We are building up supernational areas within the European and
North American communities. It's easy to move within these areas,
but it's getting harder and harder-or the goal is to make it harder
and harder-to move into these areas. This has its own pain for
people who are outside. Where you're born should have only certain
limitations. But in a political structure, it's very, very difficult to do
away with these limitations. In my view, the effort right now by the
INS in changing the asylum regulations, was to maintain the criteria
established by the Refugee Act. You still can apply for asylum
anywhere in the United States, at any time, under the existing
international criteria. This is a hard position to hold. The INS is
holding it, but if you envision a much larger increase in asylum based
on gender or whatever, then the German experience that Maryellen
talked about may become very real here. We could also change the
criteria, if the numbers got too great. It's not that we'll work out a
legal process. We can't handle the legal process. For example, there
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are bills that say we should restrict the time when people can apply
for asylum.
MOTOMURA: I'm not urging that the extension of equal protection
in immigration law would, or should, result in the striking down of
many classifications in immigration law. Similarly, I don't think that
the recognition of procedural due process as a value in immigration
law means that a given visa will be granted or denied, but we need
to develop a way of distinguishing those considerations on which
valid classifications may be based.
KESSELBRENNER: Are you talking about having places within a
country where people could go to be processed?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, my concern is that the emphasis should
be on efforts to allow people to get out of countries to seek asylum.
KESSELBRENNER: Well, I think that the answer is changing public
perceptions. A lot of what is happening amounts to so much
whining. If you look at 150,000 asylum applications," compared to
100,000,000 worldwide refugees,' 6' and you look at the burden that
countries in the horn of Africa are bearing-countries that do not
have a fraction of the wealth of the United States-it is plain that the
United States complains more than most nations. I think that when
an issue has grabbed this much political attention, a lot of what we
see is political posturing, rather than a substantive discussion of the
real issues. The issues are being debated on a level that is
completely apart from their strategic or tactical importance in
American life. Many people are hurting, and an easy response to this
pain is to focus on the changing demographics of the United States.
It's easier for certain people to say that it's the immigrants' fault that
there is so much unemployment, rather than focusing on the structure
of our society. This is really where the answers to the immigration
questions lie because the numbers aren't really what the debate is
,6 See Marc Sandalow, INS Drops Plan for Asylum Fee; Applicants Won't Have to
Pay $130.00, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1994, at A3.
161 See Bob Sutcliffe & Maggie O'Kane, The Tides of Humanity: 123 Million People
on the Move; Immigration, 41 WORLD PRESS REV. 8, 8 (1994).
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about.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Kesselbrenner, you spoke about
eighty-four precent of asylum applicants showing up for interviews
or hearings. Regarding the recent exchange concerning discretionary
criteria, you suggested that the reason for discretion was to pick and
choose among eligible people, but I believe that you said not on the
basis of national origin. I'm wondering what basis you were
referring to?
Also, you said that Haitians were being taken in to the United
States in smaller numbers because they are black. I would like to
raise the issue of whether discrimination against Haitains is due to
race or poverty. More specifically, what is often perceived by
members of the public is that black immigrants have more difficulty
assimilating to the American economic system than Asians do. Is this
preception true?
KESSELBRENNER: I'll answer the easy question first. The other
considerations in terms of discretionary asylum determinations are
whether the person exhibited minor criminal behavior, which did not
rise to the level of statutory disqualification. If someone establishes
eligibility, they should be granted relief, but a history of violations
of the immigration laws, and certain other kinds of technical factors
weigh into the denial of eligibility. The best example is minor
criminal conduct, which does not rise to the level of disqualification.
In terms of the evidence of economic disparity among ethnic
groups, I think that there are studies done in New York City
concerning the jobs generated by Haitian entrepreneurs. If you use
objective criteria, I do not think that there is any evidence that would
suggest that Haitians assimilate worse than other nationalities. The
reason I raise this study is because the imagery of African immigrants
appeals to racism. A big part of this imagery is used to create the
atmosphere that something is wrong with black immigrants. I don't
disagree that fears of unemployment are a part of the preception, but
it's significant that the only people who get interdicted systematically
are those who are black. The United States has treated Haitians
differently than it has treated refugees from other nations.
CHEN: Our discussions today certainly underscore the urgency and
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the global nature of our refugee problems. How the common interest
in dealing with refugees can be secured by taking into account
political, legal, and humanitarian factors certainly presents a
challenge to us all, and no doubt it would require concerted efforts
at all community levels-global, regional, national, and local-to cope
with this real issue.
I would like to thank our distinguished panelists for their
excellent presentations and remarks. I also would like to thank our
audience for your attention and lively participation. Thank you very
much.

